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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Robert Kane argues that “[t]he problem of free will arises in human history 
when…people are led to suspect that their actions might be determined or necessitated by factors 
unknown to them and beyond their control.”1  Historically, philosophers have worried about the 
existence of their own free will because they feel that other factors might be limiting their ability 
to act without necessity.  They worry that there might exist factors that pose a potential threat to 
their perceived freedom of choice.  This worry has led to a rich tradition within the Western 
philosophical community that continues to the present day.  This tradition is diverse in nature, 
with questions ranging from the conflict between human free will and the cause and effect 
relationship that seems to describe most occurrences in the world to a fairly recent debate about 
the implications of quantum mechanics for actions that occur without necessity.   
 This thesis will be a work in comparative literature.  Comparison is important because it 
allows the scholar to view the literature and the tradition in a vastly different way.  It facilitates 
new discussion of otherwise worn topics.  This thesis, it has uniquely added to the long history of 
scholarship on medieval Christian thought and analyzed the notion of free will in literature that 
appears to take its existence for granted.  For the Buddhist tradition, this comparison allows for 
the topic of Buddhist free will to be considered in a new light.  In general, comparison fosters 
new ways of thinking about topics that can eventually lead to breakthroughs in scholarly 
research. 
 During the late medieval and early modern periods, the debate and concern among 
Christian philosophies focused on the relationship between divine omniscience and human 
freedom.  Philosophers saw a large conflict between their views concerning the nature of God 
and their own freedom of choice.  This basic worry can be formulated in the following argument: 
                                                
 1 Robert Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 5. 
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1. God is omniscient. 
2. Omniscience entails knowledge of all worldly occurrences. 
3. These worldly occurrences encompass past, present, and future actions. 
4. Knowledge of future actions includes the knowledge of all of my future 
actions. 
5. Being omniscient, God is infallible. 
6. Thus, those things which God knows I will do in the future must occur as God 
knows they will. 
7. Hence my actions are necessary. 
8. Free will excludes the idea of necessary action. 
9. Therefore, if God is omniscient, I necessarily have no free will. 
Most Christian philosophers have felt compelled to disprove this argument.  Rejecting the 
conclusion, they were forced to find a solution that included both individual freedom and the 
concept of divine knowledge.  Philosophers from Augustine through Plantinga have attempted to 
do this, modifying the theories to fix the problems associated with those theories that came 
before. 
 Moving to the Buddhist tradition, the theories that I cite within this thesis are said to bear 
the closest resemblance to the original teachings of Sakyamuni.  While I use secondary sources 
to explain the tradition, the sources are of a different nature than the primary sources that I use to 
discuss the Christian tradition.  They are the works of modern philosophers who attempt to 
explain the Buddha’s teachings rather than defend one aspect of them or another.  In short, my 
goal in choosing the different texts was to focus on Sakyamuni’s philosophy alone.  Within the 
literature that I analyzed, there is a general acceptance that humans do have free will, but that 
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this free will exists within a causal network.  This network is explained by the theory of 
Dependent Origination2, which was realized by the Buddha upon attaining Enlightenment.  In a 
few words, it states that the entire material world is connected through a web of causes and 
effects.3  Dependent Origination governs the entirety of the physical world, including the lives of 
humans.  As such, humans are determined by their past actions in a chain that goes back to the 
beginning of time. 
 The Theory of Dependent Origination raises the question of how exactly humans possess 
freedom.  If all human actions are determined by prior events, then it does not seem possible for 
them to be freely chosen.  The argument might take the following form: 
 1. The entire world is governed by the Theory of Dependent Origination. 
 2. This includes human action. 
 3. The Theory of Dependent Origination creates a fatalistic4 connection between 
 causes and effects. 
 4. If all human actions necessarily follow their causes, then no human action is 
 free. 
 5. Thus, free will does not exist. 
The Buddha’s philosophy assumes that free will exists without much question or concern.  This 
means that any discussion or analysis of this problem must be accomplished through the addition 
of Western concepts.  This does not mean, though, that the discussion is not an interesting and 
insightful one.  While the Buddha may not have sought answers to this particular tension, the 
                                                
2 The phrase “Dependent Origination” is slightly outdated.  However, I will follow the convention of my sources in 
continuing to use it.  The phrase “conditioned coarising” is more accepted by modern scholars. 
 3 G.C. Pande, “Causality in Buddhist Philosophy,” in A Companion to World Philosophies, ed. Eliot 
Deutsch and Ron Bontekoe. Advisory Eds. Tu Weiming (Chinese) J.N. Mohanty (Indian) Ninian Smart (Buddhism) 
Manetta Stepaniants (Islam), (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1999), 371. 
 4 Fatalism is the idea that there is nothing that can be done to alter the present circumstances because they 
are necessarily determined. 
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conflict still exists within Buddhist thought and scholarship on the topic should still be 
examined.   
 At the heart of the conflict between free will and determinism5 is the idea of ethics.  Both 
traditions affirm that moral responsibility correlates with the agent’s freedom of choice.  It seems 
impossible to assign the agent moral responsibility for an action over which she has no control 
over.  Both traditions must therefore solve the free will issue in a way that allows for humans to 
take responsibility for their actions.  Buddhism and Christianity both acknowledge the 
implications of this issue to ethics, and the discussion of free will is fueled by it.  Both traditions 
assume that free will exists and work to adjust their other beliefs in order to account for morality. 
 Within the Western philosophical tradition, the problem of evil6 perfectly describes the 
conflict between morality and omniscience.  The philosopher William Rowe formulates it in the 
following way: 
1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient, 
being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or 
permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense 
 suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater 
 good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
 3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.7 
 
While not phrased in terms of free will, the Christian philosophers have consistently contended 
that the solution to the problem of evil must include free will.  However, their theories redefine 
the topic to make it compatible with divine omniscience.  By altering the traditional definitions 
                                                
 5 I use determinism to apply to both the tension between divine omniscience and free will and the tension 
between the Theory of Dependent Origination and free will. 
6 The Problem of Evil consists of the moral problem outlined by Rowe and the problem concerning the 
natural evil in the world.  I focus on the moral problem throughout this thesis because of its relation to free will. 
 7 William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” in The Evidential Argument 
from Evil ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 2. 
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of freedom and of divine omniscience, the philosophers bring the two opposing ideas together 
into fairly consistent theories. 
 Through their alterations of the term, theist philosophers absolve God from responsibility 
for human sins through their explanations of free will.  By giving the agent free will, God 
transfers responsibility to the agent; she is the one who makes immoral decisions and performs 
immoral actions.  Thus, the evil in the world is the agent’s fault and not God’s.  The extent to 
which one relieves God from this responsibility determines whether or not one believes that the 
proponent of the problem of evil wins the argument. 
 The problem for the Buddhist tradition is slightly different.8  The tradition does not have 
to reconcile a belief in an omniscient deity with human action.  It does, however, have to explain 
how a system of morality can exist given the assumption that human responsibility depends on 
freedom.  The problem might be formulated as follows:  
 1. The Theory of Dependent Origination exists. 
 2. The human agent must be free if she is responsible for her actions. 
 3. The Theory of Dependent Origination appears fatalistic. 
 4. Thus, the human agent is not free. 
 5. The agent is not responsible for her actions. 
The Buddhist philosophy uses karma to explain the way an agent retains responsibility.  The 
karmic theory uses probability to as a means to solving the tension.  The agent’s karmic past 
creates a set of probable outcomes, but the agent’s free will ultimately makes the decision.9   
                                                
8 This difference is partially due to the fact that volition is not central to Buddhist philosophy.  While 
acknowledged within traditional texts, it was not a main concern. 
 9 David J. Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, foreword by Eliot Deutsch 
(Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1975), 129. 
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 Scholarship that compares Buddhism and Christianity is extensive.  However, there is 
little, if any, that focuses specifically on the similarities between their treatments of free will.  
This thesis works to fill that void.  With the continuing presence of the free will problem within 
Western thought, comparison with another tradition’s ideas works to bring us closer to an 
understanding that solves the debate.  Additionally, the topic of ethics has continually interested 
philosophers in both traditions.  Scholars want to know how and why an agent is held 
accountable.  This comparison facilitates discussion between philosophers on both sides, 
hopefully leading to a more encompassing solution. 
 As mentioned earlier, the aim of this thesis will be a comparison of Western and Eastern 
thought concerning free will.  It will be done through an analysis of specific theories found 
within both the Christian and the Theravadin traditions.  After a lengthy discussion of each 
tradition, I will use a modern theory of free will to compare the two theories.  In addition to 
analyzing both the Buddhist and the Christian conceptions of free will, I will attempt to draw 
parallels between the treatments of the topic within both religions.  While the scholarship 
discussed takes vastly different approaches to the tension found in both traditions, I shall argue 
that the solutions to tend to mirror each other.   
Dyckson 9  
Chapter 2: Medieval Philosophy: An Analysis 
 When understanding the ideas propounded by medieval Western philosophers, it is 
important to understand the basic assumptions they make concerning Christianity.  This is 
especially important because these assumptions are not necessarily the same ones made by the 
non-educated laity.  The typical Christian during the medieval period did not attempt to 
understand her own free will in relation to God’s knowledge.  Most likely, she would accept both 
doctrines without consideration of whether or not her beliefs were logically coherent.  As in most 
religious traditions, there is often a discontinuity between what the theologians argue is the 
proper way of understanding the religious dogma and the everyday practice of it.  Thus, the 
issues discussed in this thesis will not be issues that concerned the typical medieval person and 
should be understood solely from within this context.  The theologian is charged with making 
logical sense of a religion in order to propagate it and in the face of challenges raised by those 
practitioners who take interest in its underlying assumptions.  Without the theologian, these 
practitioners’ questions would remain unanswered and the masses might become distrustful of 
their religious leaders. 
 Within the Western tradition, science and religion have been intimately connected in a 
way that they are not in other traditions.  For that reason, the discussion of the assumptions of 
Western philosophers must incorporate the scientific developments occurring at the time of the 
lives of the philosophers.  As Armstrong writes, 
In the past…some rationalists and mystics had gone out of their way to depart 
from a literal reading of the Bible…in favor of a deliberately symbolic 
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interpretation.  Now Protestants and Catholics had both begun to put their faith in 
an entirely literal understanding of scripture.10 
In this quotation, Armstrong is referring to the period directly before the early modern period, 
the time we usually refer to as the medieval period.  Both the Catholics and the Protestants were 
moving away from the acceptance of scientific advancements, like that put forth by Copernicus, 
on the basis that the advancements contradicted the messages of the Bible.11  Armstrong argues 
that this literal interpretation “would make the traditional religious mythology vulnerable to the 
new science and would eventually make it impossible for many people to believe in God at 
all.”12 
Later during the early modern period, circa the 17th century, Western thinkers began 
moving away from a traditional, mystical understanding of religion and towards a more rational, 
empirical one.  This change from a literal interpretation of the Bible was partially brought about 
by the philosophers of the time who began to view God and his existence as a fact like any other.  
They felt compelled to rethink many of their assumptions concerning the nature of God and to 
prove his existence rather than just accepting it.  Their approach to religion was based on the 
assumption that reason and faith are compatible, which was advocated for during the medieval 
period by Duns Scotus who translated many ancient Greek texts and based his reasoning on the 
arguments of Plato and Aristotle.13  His work became the starting point for many of the 
philosophers during the early modern period. 
Given the desire to prove that God existed, these thinkers turned their attention towards 
proofs that were partially based on the empirical evidence that they found in the physical world, 
                                                
 10 Karen Armstrong, A History of God: the 4000-Year Quest of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, (New 
York:Gramercy Books, 1993), 291. 
 11 Ibid, 289-90. 
 12 Ibid, 289-290. 
 13 Ibid, 197-198. 
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as opposed to those before who attempted to exclude the physical world from the proof.  
According to Armstrong, these philosophers moved toward a more modern scientific model 
because they wanted to replicate the types of studies being done, and proofs being constructed, in 
the academic community surrounding them.14  In other words, they were living in a time of great 
advancements in the realm of physical science; they sought to prove God’s existence through the 
same accepted means.  As Armstrong says, they “felt compelled to verify the objective reality of 
God, in the same way they proved other demonstrable phenomena.”15  Philosophers, Aquinas 
specifically, also began distinguishing between the human conception of the God and God 
himself,16 this distinction allowed them to make claims about his divine characteristics, even as 
they also claimed that humans could not fully understand him.  This allowed them to argue that 
God is all knowing while also arguing that humans cannot fully comprehend what this means.  
Above all, this new approach to religion was rational; philosophers were looking to explain God 
in a way that could be verified and understood through the new approach to scientific study.17 
 In their attempts to prove God’s existence, these philosophers also had to prove the 
logical coherence of the totality of the characteristics that they ascribed to him.  As Kenny states, 
“The coherence of the notion of God, as possessor of the traditional divine attributes, is a 
necessary…condition for God’s existence.”18  The characteristics most investigated by 
philosophers included omniscience and omnipotence because they are predicates created solely 
to apply to the divine being; it is not possible to understand them through an application to the 
human condition.  For these reasons, philosophers have consistently explored these topics in 
great detail and with relation to many other religious issues.   
                                                
 14 Ibid, 296. 
 15 Ibid. 
 16 Ibid, 205. 
 17 Ibid, 306. 
 18 Anthony Kenny, The God of the Philosophers, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 5. 
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 One of these religious conflicts is the apparent one associated with God’s omniscience 
and human free action.  For the philosophers, omniscience means that God is all-knowing, and 
included in this ability is the concept divine foreknowledge,19 meaning that he knows all future 
events in addition to present and past ones.  Given this assumption, philosophers then attempt to 
reconcile human freedom of will with God’s perfect knowledge.  They must explain how God 
can know all future human actions while also maintaining that humans act freely.   
 We can distinguish two ways to construe the relationship between free will and 
omniscience; incompatibilism and compatibilism.  The incompatibilist position holds that “an 
agent is free with respect to a given action at a given time if at that time it is within the agent’s 
power to perform the action and also in the agent’s power to refrain from the action.”20  
Proponents of this theory argue that free will and determinism are not compatible.  The definition 
excludes the possibility that the agent’s decisions are influenced by prior actions or thoughts, 
meaning that the agent is capable of choosing any of the possible outcomes in a given situation.  
The agent chooses ‘spontaneously’ which action she decides to take.  This notion of freedom is 
not compatible with divine foreknowledge because it holds that the agent’s actions are fully 
within her power at all times.  This means that she is capable of performing or not performing 
any action at any given time.  In contrast, divine foreknowledge, as stated above, means that God 
knows all events prior to their occurrence.  If God foreknows all things, it becomes problematic 
to talk about humans acting freely, given the above definition of freedom, because his 
foreknowledge would occur prior to their actions.  Also, the definition of omniscience prevents 
                                                
 19 The adjective “divine” means that the foreknowledge possessed by God is all encompassing.  He knows 
every event that will take place and every event of the past and present.  In other words, his knowledge is not limited 
in the same way that human knowledge is. 
 20 William Hasker.  “Middle Knowledge, Foreknowledge, and the Openness of God” in Philosophy and 
Faith: A Philosophy of Religion Reader, ed. David Shatz, (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 2002), 
55.  Italics in original. 
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God from being wrong.  This entails that humans could not act simply through their own agency 
because they must act according the knowledge that God has prior to their actions.  To act in a 
way that proves God’s knowledge incorrect is to prove him fallible, a characteristic that the 
philosophers are not willing to attribute to God.  The human agent, it seems, is going to act in a 
way that affirms God’s knowledge, meaning that she cannot act according to her own agency 
alone, if at all.  Rowe formulates the argument as such: 
1. God knows before we are born everything we will do. 
2. If God knows before we are born everything we will do, then it is never in our 
power to do otherwise. 
3. If it is never in our power to do otherwise, then there is no human freedom. 
4. There is no human freedom.21 
 
It appears that the philosopher sets out to combine two notions that are inherently contradictory.  
Many different philosophers have attempted to solve this problem in many different ways. 
 In order to more fully understand the problem at hand, a few things should be said about 
the assumptions that these philosophers make about free will and about its relation to divine 
omniscience.  Firstly, their notion of free will depends on the compatibility of human free will 
and divine foreknowledge; if the two ideas are not compatible, then the philosophers have no 
coherent argument.22  This is clear given the nature of the tension.  If it is possible for God to 
have infallible foreknowledge and for humans to have free will, then the problem dissolves.   
Secondly, their idea of free will is semi-derived from the way in which they immediately 
perceived the world.  Human actions appear to be the result of their own deliberations and 
decisions to act in conjunction with the influences which they take from the world around them.  
These notions about free will are encompassed by the modern free will theory called 
                                                
 21 William L.Rowe, “Predestination, Divine Foreknowledge, and Human Freedom” in Philosophy and 
Faith: A Philosophy of Religion Reader, ed. David Shatz, (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 2001), 
46-7. 
 22 Kane, (2005). 
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compatibilism.  Compatibilism holds that “an agent is free with respect to a given action at a 
given time if at that time it is true that the agent can perform the action if she decides to perform 
it and she can refrain from the action if she decides not to perform it.”23  This definition of 
freedom allows for factors outside of the agent to affect her actions and decisions as long as she 
retains the ability to perform those actions which she chooses to.  Compatibilism allows the 
philosopher to argue that human free will is compatible with some form of determinism.  The 
agent’s decisions are regarded as free if she makes them without any coercion and without any 
prohibition to her actions.  However, her actions are still influenced by things like society, prior 
actions, and many other things. 
 With regard to the tension being discussed, compatibilists maintain that God’s absolute 
knowledge of the future is compatible with the human’s ability to decide her future actions 
because she is not kept form doing that which she decides to do or not to do; her actions are 
simply influenced by the knowledge of God.  The problem for the philosopher then becomes 
finding a theory that best explains how humans have free will given that God knows all of their 
future actions.   
 Now that we have a basic understanding of the assumptions that the philosophers make 
with regard to the nature of God and of their understanding of free will, it is possible to turn to 
their actual arguments.  The discussion will begin with Augustine who wrote during the early 
part of the Common Era and ends with Alvin Plantinga who is a modern philosopher. 
 The discussion of the problem between divine foreknowledge and human free will begins 
with Augustine in his work, On Free Choice of the Will.  In it, he asserts that human free will is 
compatible with God’s omniscience because humans retain control over their will and because 
foreknowledge does not entail necessity.  A person can still be free to perform a certain action 
                                                
 23 Hasker, (2002), 55.  Italics in original. 
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even if another knows that she will do so.  To prove this, he provides a thought experiment.  
Augustine writes, 
 Then suppose, for example, that you are going to be happy a year from now.  That 
 means that a year from now God is going to make you happy….And God knows 
 today what he is going to do a year from now….Then the happiness that God 
 gives you takes place by necessity and not by will.  You could not help thinking 
 that the only thing that is within our power is that which we do when we will 
 it….Therefore, although God foreknows what we are going to will in the future, it 
 does not follow that we do not will by the will….Simply because God foreknows 
 your future happiness…it does not follow that you will be happy against your 
 will.24 
 
Throughout this argument, Augustine is conversing in dialogue with his student Evodius.  He 
tells his student to suppose that he would be happy one year from now and that God knows that 
he will be happy.  God not only knows that he will be happy in one year’s time but will bring it 
about that he is happy.  God’s knowledge does not mean that Evodius will not will to be happy.  
On the contrary, Evodius claims that at the time of the conversation he wills to be happy in one 
year.  Augustine argues that this proves that Evodius’ will is always within his control and that 
the things which he desires do not necessarily happen because they are in accordance with his 
will.25  This thought experiment leaves much unanswered though.  In order for Augustine to 
prove that God’s omniscience and human free will are compatible in the way needed to avoid the 
problem arising between omniscience and free will, he needs to prove that divine omniscience, 
not human foreknowledge, does not entail necessary human action (or the necessity that the 
agent will for certain things).  He thinks that he does this through discussion of divine 
foreknowledge in relation to human foreknowledge.  As Augustine correctly asserts, person A’s 
knowledge that person B will perform an action does not necessitate that person B perform the 
action.  Person B performs the action of her own volition.  Augustine wants to argue that divine 
                                                
 24 Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will translated by Thomas Williams, (Indianapolis:  Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1993), 75-76. 
 25 Ibid. 
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foreknowledge works in the same way.  He states, “if your foreknowledge is consistent with his 
freedom in sinning, so that you foreknow what someone else is going to do by his own will, then 
God forces no one to sin, even though he foresees those who are going to sin by their own will”.  
God’s knowledge that humans will perform certain actions does not necessitate the performance 
of said actions.26  Knowledge alone does not bring about another’s actions.   
 However, there seems to be a difference between God’s knowledge and human 
knowledge.  The difference is that human knowledge is fallible.  It is possible that person A 
believes that person B will perform an action, but person B may actually perform a different one.  
The fact that God is omniscient, though, prohibits him from making mistakes like the one 
described; as stated above, omniscience implies infallibility.  Augustine assumes that God’s 
knowledge is perfect; nothing can occur other than how he knows it will and nothing occurs that 
he does not know about.  Thus, if God knows that person B will perform action C, the definition 
of omniscience appears to indicate that person B will not only perform the action but will 
perform it necessarily.  Thus, Augustine’s attempt to reconcile the problem does not succeed.   
 Boethius made the next large contribution to the problem of God’s omniscience and 
human free will in his work The Consolation of Philosophy.27  Boethius agreed with Augustine 
in his view that the problem is one of God’s foreknowledge functioning differently than human 
knowledge.  In fact, Boethius argues that humans cannot have foreknowledge in the way that 
God does.  He states 
 [T]he most excellent knowledge is that which by its own nature knows not only its 
 own proper object but also the objects of all lower kinds of knowledge….The 
 situation is much the same when human reason supposes that the divine 
 intelligence beholds future events only as reason herself sees them.  For you argue 
 that if some things seem not to have certain and necessary outcomes, they cannot 
                                                
 26 Ibid, 78. 
 27 Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, Translated by Richard Green, (United States: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, Inc., 1962). 
Dyckson 17  
 be foreknown as certainly about to happen…or, if we believe that there is such 
 foreknowledge, that the outcome of all things is controlled by necessity.28 
 
If God has this sort of knowledge, then humans do not have control over their future actions.  
The necessity of God’s knowledge means that the things which he knows must necessarily occur 
or his knowledge would be incorrect, and thus not necessary.  Given the all-encompassing scope 
of God’s knowledge, if his knowledge is necessary, then all actions are pre-determined.  To solve 
this problem, Boethius proposes the theory of a timeless god.  This conception of God places him 
in a timeless realm where all worldly events are viewed by him in the same moment.29  
Timelessness is a difficult concept to understand.  A timeless god would be one which was in no 
way affected by the passing of time.  But, the concept has much larger implications than this.  A 
timeless god is one which does not exist in time; he exists outside of it while retaining the ability 
to view events that occur within the realm governed by time.  However, for this god all events 
appear to take place at the same moment; the past, present, and future; he does not view the 
events sequentially as humans do. 
 This conception of God eliminates arguments about his having foreknowledge in the 
traditional sense because there is no “future” for him.  Boethius and other advocates for the 
theory of God’s timelessness are careful to explain that the future still exists for humans.  Thus, 
God still knows the future events of humanity, but he does not know them as such.30  Boethius 
argues that this eliminates the necessity of God’s foreknowledge because it is not knowledge that 
occurred in the past, implying that it is not already determined.   
                                                
 28 Ibid. (pp. 113-114). 
 29 In order to explain Boethius’ theory, it is necessary to describe the way in which God knows the events 
of the world.  However, it is difficult to explain the way God knows things without using tensed language.  For 
simplicity’s sake, I will use tensed language with the assumption that the reader understands that God exists 
timelessly. 
 30 Boethius, (1962), 116. 
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 Aquinas furthers Boethius’ theory.  He agrees with Boethius that God exists outside of 
time and sees all of eternity simultaneously.  He also argues that the future is still prevalent for 
humans.  Aquinas attempts to further the theory of a timeless deity and to answer an objection 
that arose in the philosophical community concerning the necessity of the future despite the 
concern that God’s knowledge is of an ever-changing present rather than of the future.  To 
answer this objection, he separates God’s knowledge into statements about his knowledge from 
statements about the things in themselves as they occur in the world.  According to Aquinas, 
statements about God’s knowledge of future contingents, future actions that have non-necessary 
outcomes, are necessary, but statements about the future contingents themselves are not.31  
Aquinas writes  
 Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason 
 of the proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is contingent 
 by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun, 
 which is the first cause is necessary.32  
 
In this text, the “supreme necessary cause” is the knowledge of God.  The “proximate contingent 
cause” is some event in the temporal world; in the context of free will it would be the human 
agent’s willing the effect.  This means that there is a difference between talking about the things 
that God knows and the things his knowledge concerns.  Aquinas attempts to argue that God’s 
knowledge is necessary because it is his knowledge, which is by its very nature necessary 
because it is infallible.  However, the objects of his knowledge, human actions, exist within time 
and are not necessary because humans have free will.  While this assertion might work to 
alleviate some of the tension between God’s necessary knowledge, it is important to note that 
Aquinas also asserts that things are the way they are because God wills them.  If things are as 
                                                
 31Thomas Aquinas, “Question XIV: On God’s Knowledge” Introduction to Saint Thomas Aquinas, in ed. 
with translation by. Anton C. Pegis, (New York: The Modern Library, 1948), 154. 
 32 Ibid, 153.  
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God wills them, then they are predetermined and cannot happen any other way.  Thus, it appears 
that things are necessary, despite Aquinas’ attempts to prove otherwise. 
 Kenny argues against Aquinas’ position, stating that it is “theologically unimportant and 
inessential to the tradition of western theism.”33  Rather than leaving the argument at this, he 
quotes Arthur Prior’s argument about the ability of a timeless deity to know events that take 
place within the realm of time.  Prior argues that if God exists outside of time then he cannot 
have knowledge of temporal occurrences.  A timeless god has no way of acknowledging when 
events have taken place and when they have not.  He writes 
 God could not…know that the 1960 final examinations at Manchester are now 
 over.  For this isn’t something that he or anyone could know timelessly, because it 
 just isn’t true timelessly….that argument that what we know when we know that 
 the 1960 final examinations are over can’t be just a timeless relation between 
 dates, because this isn’t the thing we’re pleased about when we’re pleased the 
 examinations are over.34 
 
Prior relies on our intuitions about what we feel when we say that we know something as it exists 
within a temporal realm.  To be happy that an event is over is not simply to know that it follows 
the preceding event.  There is joy in knowing that the event has actually taken place.  Prior 
claims that a timeless deity is not capable of knowing when events have taken place because the 
deity does not exist timelessly.  The only thing that the timeless deity can know is that the end of 
the finals at Manchester comes after the students take them.  Such a deity cannot know that the 
finals are over because it does not exist in a realm where such knowledge is possible.   
 God is attributed with knowledge of events yet to occur; this knowledge is none other 
than divine foreknowledge.  To give another example, God has knowledge of when I was born, 
but he fails to know that this event has actually occurred already.  Prior argues that Boethius’ 
understanding of God as a timeless being prohibits him from knowing this second piece of 
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information because only beings that exist within the realm of time are able to recognize that 
events have already taken place.35  At best, the conception of a timeless god means that the god 
knows that I am a creature who will be born, experience certain things, and die.  He can have no 
knowledge of what is yet to come in my life.  This seems to contradict what is meant when 
Christians speak of divine omniscience.  This contradiction effectively renders any conception of 
divine foreknowledge incomprehensible within the timeless deity model. 
 Aquinas formulates his argument as a response to the argument that a timeless god’s 
knowledge is still necessary; this was an objection to Boethius’ The Consolation of Philosophy.  
Aquinas argues that God’s knowledge is necessary, insofar as it is his knowledge.  However, the 
future contingents in question are not necessary because they exist within the material world and 
do not necessarily follow from their causes.  This does not mean, though, that the ultimate cause, 
God’s knowledge, is not necessary.  Boethius takes a different approach to answering this 
problem.  He distinguishes two different types of necessity.  The first is a simple kind of 
necessity as in the statement, “all men are mortals”.  The second kind of necessity “is 
conditional, as is the case when, if you know that someone is walking, he must necessarily be 
walking.” 36  Boethius argues that the second kind of necessity is conditional upon some outside 
force and is not dependent on the nature of the object in question.  As he argues, “No necessity 
forces the man who is voluntarily walking to move forward; but as long as he is walking, he is 
necessarily moving forward.”37  In the same way, God’s knowledge of things is necessary, but 
the things do not have necessity in their inherent nature.38 
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 The question of whether or not this argument works is an important one.  If God’s 
knowledge can be separated from the things about which he has knowledge, then the timeless 
god theory solves the problem of free will and omniscience.  However, it is not at all clear that 
the philosopher is able to separate divine knowledge in this way.  Omniscience still seems to 
imply that if God knows that something will occur, then it necessarily occurs.  Thus, the relations 
between objects and actions in the realm of time are necessary because God knows that they will 
occur.  Unless the definition of omniscience is altered to allow for Aquinas’ distinction, the 
theory of timelessness does not work. 
 A third attempt at solving this problem was put forth by Ockham in his work 
Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents.39   His approach to the problem 
distinguishes sentences solely about the future from those that appear to be about the future but 
are actually about the past.  He uses philosophical analysis of language to justify his 
understanding of God’s foreknowledge.  Ockham bases his solution on Aristotle’s theory of 
human knowledge.  According to Aristotle, one can only have knowledge of true propositions.  
Aristotle’s argument is laid out in his “Chapter Nine” of De Interpretatione.40  Here he argues 
that propositions about the past and present are necessary; their truth values are fixed.  Future 
propositions concerning particulars are contingent, not necessary.  Thus, particular propositions 
about the future have the possibility of occurring or not occurring.  The truth value of 
propositions about the past and present are fixed because the nature of the past and present are 
fixed.  Statements about the future are not fixed in this way because future events are not 
determined; there is still the possibility that the events may or may not occur.  This 
                                                
 39 William Ockham, Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents, translated by Marilyn 
McCord Adams and Norman Kretzman, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis, IN, 1983). 
 40 Aristotle, Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, translated with notes and glossary by J.L. 
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Dyckson 22  
understanding of the future assumes that free will is a human characteristic that affects the 
outcome of situations.  Aristotle proves this point using his famous thought experiment involving 
a sea battle.  He argues that the statement “It is necessary that a sea battle will or will not occur 
tomorrow” is true.  However, it is not true to say that “It is necessary that a sea battle will occur 
tomorrow” or that “It is necessary that a sea battle will not occur tomorrow.”41  The above 
argument is based on the following reasoning.  Given any situation, there are at least two 
possible outcomes—either outcome A will occur or outcome A will not occur.  This means that a 
statement about the necessity of the future contingent proposition is true only when the two 
outcomes are written as a disjunction—A either will or will not happen.  It is impossible to prove 
the truth of either disjunct because future events are governed by free, contingent actions.  In 
other words, a person can know that her friend will or will not attend classes, but until her friend 
arrives at class she has no way of knowing which of these two possibilities will occur. 
 Ockham uses Aristotle’s distinction between two types of necessity to prove that 
propositions about the future are only known contingently.  If the above thought experiment 
holds, then it appears that propositions solely about the future are also contingent.  Ockham 
argues that statements concerning predestination and reprobation appear to be about the past but 
are actually about the future.  In Assumption Two he argues that, “All propositions having to do 
with predestination and reprobation are contingent whether they are of present tense…or of past 
tense, or of future tense.”42  He then goes on to argue in Assumptions Three and Four that some 
propositions appear to be about the present, but these propositions are actually contingent upon 
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the future.43  He states that “All propositions having to do with predestination and reprobation, 
whether they are verbally about the present or about the past, are nevertheless equivalently about 
the future, since their truth depends on the truth of propositions formally about the future”44. 
Statements of this kind are contingent because they are not true until their actualization.  Ockham 
argues that God “knows future contingents” but “it must be held that He does so, but 
contingently.45  In other words, Ockham wants to maintain that God has foreknowledge but that 
it is contingent upon human free will. 
 Ockham writes that God cannot have determinant knowledge of future contingents 
because their truth of falsity is not determined.  In Assumption Five he argues that “From the 
Philosopher’s46 point of view God does not know one part of a contradiction [to be true] any 
more than [He knows] the other,”47 this statement refers to future contingents.  Recalling his 
argument from Assumption Four, it is obvious that God only knows future events contingently.  
If this were not the case, predestination and reprobation would be real qualities inhering in 
individuals.  Ockham writes 
 I take someone-A-who is now predestinate, and I ask whether or not A can 
 commit the sin of final impenitence.  If he cannot, then necessarily he will be 
 saved, which is absurd.  If he can…then I ask whether or not the real relation of 
 predestination has been destroyed….if it has not…then it remains in A when A is 
 reprobate.  Consequently, A will be at one and the same time both reprobate and 
 predestinate.48 
 
Having both predestination and reprobation as inherent characteristics of one agent is absurd.  
The agent would be both saved and damned at the same time.  If, however, the relations are not 
inherent within a person, that is, they depend on future human action, then God’s knowledge is 
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dependent upon future human actions.  Thus, more generally, Ockham argues that God’s 
knowledge is, at least partially, dependent upon human free actions.  Damnation and salvation 
are withheld until such time when all free human actions are completed.   
 Adams and Kretzmann argue that Ockham’s formulation of God’s knowledge of future 
contingents and of the fact that predestination and reprobation are dependent upon future actions 
is incoherent.  They claim that this incompatibility is based on Aristotle’s rendering of the 
contingency of future actions.49  Ockham argues that the truth value of future acts is to be 
determined at some time later in time.  As Adams and Kretzmann say, “[I]f neither the past truth 
nor God’s past foreknowledge falls under the necessity of the past, the Aristotelian argument that 
His determinate knowledge of them would destroy the efficacy of human deliberation and 
choice, fails”.50  Here Adams and Kretzmann affirm that Ockham saves his theory from the 
fatalistic conclusion that human actions are determined by the foreknowledge of God and thus 
not within the agent’s control by arguing that the truth of statements concerning the future has 
yet to be determined. 
 Molina, writing during the 16th century, takes Ockham’s argument concerning the truth 
value of future contingents and expand on it to encompass an explanation of how God has 
foreknowledge at all.  His solution to the conflict between divine omniscience and human free 
will has been referred to as middle knowledge.  Kane argues that 
 Molina begins by distinguishing three types of knowledge that God would have.  
 Te first is God’s knowledge of all that is necessary or possible.  Being omniscient, 
 God would know everything that must be and also every possibility—everything 
 that might be.  In addition…God would know, among contingent things…which 
 of them actually existed…between these two types of divine knowledge…there is 
 another.51   
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This in between knowledge is that which Molina referred to as middle knowledge, and it is this 
knowledge which he thinks solves Ockham’s problem.  Hasker defines middle knowledge in a 
very succinct way: 
 for each possible free creature that might exist, and for each possible situation in 
 which such a creature might make a free choice, there is a truth, known to God 
 prior to and independent of any decision on God’s part, concerning what definite 
 choice that creature would freely make if place in that situation.52 
 
God’s knowledge includes the truth concerning all possible human actions.  In other words, his 
knowledge is not limited to those actions that take place within the material world; it also 
includes those actions that could take place and do not.  This definition means that God’s 
knowledge is independent of human actions.  Hasker writes,  
 God knows the truth of this whether or not A ever actually is placed in Circumstances C; 
 indeed, God knows this whether or not A even exists, so that his knowledge about this is 
 entirely independent of any of God’s own decisions about creation and providence.53 
 
Middle knowledge relies on the existence of possibilities that have not actually occurred.  Thus, 
there are two outcomes in any situation; middle knowledge assumes that it is possible for God to 
know both of these potential outcomes.  By stating that God’s knowledge is independent of the 
world he created, Molina frees himself from the problem of God’s knowledge being determined 
by the free agents in the actual world.  This solves the problem that Ockham faced—omniscience 
that is determined by the free agents that God created.  It allows Molina to claim that God knows 
the outcome of any situation despite the fact that the human agent is free in his decisions.  As 
Hasker states, God, in choosing to create [free agents] and place them in those situations, knew 
exactly what their responses would be.”54  As Hasker argues, God retains omniscience because 
he knows how humans will react to any given situation, but humans retain free will because they 
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 53 Ibid (pp. 20-21).  Italics in original. 
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freely choose their actions within the circumstances.  God does not foresee the future as events 
occur; he knows the truth concerning the outcome of the events prior to the creation of free 
agents.  God also knows the outcome of all possible situations because he knows exactly which 
circumstances and individuals he created.55   
 Hasker presents a few challenges to Molina’s theory.  One of these questions whether or 
not the counterfactuals actually exist.  As Hasker phrases it, “[t]he chief difficulty that the 
proponent of middle knowledge must confront is the contention that the truths God is alleged to 
know… ‘counterfactuals of freedom,’ do not exist to be known.”56  The traditional response to 
this challenge offers examples from the Christian Bible.  Specifically, the Bible speaks of God’s 
prophecies which take the following form:  
 if his followers perform action X then some terrible consequence will occur, if 
 they do not perform action X then destruction will not come. 
As Hasker points out, these examples are not very strong because the prophecies are delivered by 
beings or things that can only provide yes or no answers.  This means that the prophecies do not 
take into account all possible circumstances; namely, they do not take into account circumstances 
that have multiple factors.  They also have a fifty percent chance of succeeding, making their 
credibility circumspect.57   
 The theory of middle knowledge has recently been revisited by the philosopher Alvin 
Plantinga.  He has modernized the theory, combining it with possible worlds semantics.  
Plantinga uses the theory to prove that the argument he calls ‘The Free Will Defence’58 is 
coherent and credible.  He gives this basic formulation of the Free Will Defence “A world 
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containing creatures who are sometimes significantly free…is more valuable…than a world 
containing no free creatures at all.  Now God can create free creatures, but he cannot cause or 
determine them to do only what is right.  For if he does so…they do not do what is right 
freely.”59  Plantinga concludes that God must create the possibility for moral evil if the creatures 
that he creates are free in any significant way.60  Plantinga makes this very clear when he states, 
“The heart of the Free Will Defence is the claim that it is possible that God could not have 
created a universe containing moral good…without creating one containing moral evil.”61  Given 
this rendering of the Free Will Defence, the question becomes whether or not God could have 
created a world with moral good which also lacks moral evil. 
 Plantinga answers this question by eliminating the worlds which God could not have 
created.  Among them, he argues, are worlds in which God alters necessary facts.  He writes, 
“Necessary states of affairs do not owe their actuality to the creative activity of God.”62  Thus, 
God is only responsible for contingent states of affairs.  Plantinga also argues that God does not 
have the power to change the past.  Thus, “he can no longer actualize” states of affairs that have 
already taken place.63  This assumption is also made by philosophers like Ockham who argue 
that only statements about the future are contingent. 
 The third condition that Plantinga places on the worlds that God could have brought into 
existence is that he can only create those in which he exists.  At this point, Plantinga 
reformulates the question that he is trying to answer as, “If God is omnipotent, then he could 
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have actualized just any world that includes his existence?”64  Plantinga responds to the question 
by stating that God can only actualize a given state of affairs S only if he can cause S.  But, he 
can only actualize a world W if he can actualize every state of affairs S that W includes.  God 
could not actualize a world W if that world did not contain his existence because then he could 
not be the creator of that world.  If he creates a world, then he must exist with respect to that 
world.  Furthermore, God cannot cause the states of affairs that bring about a free agent’s 
decisions.  To actualize the states of affairs that cause free actions would be to cause the free 
actions, making them not free.  Thus 
 there are any number of possible worlds that God could not have actualized, even though 
 they include his existence: all those containing a state of affairs consisting in some 
 creature’s freely taking or refraining from some action.65 
 
This means that God could not have actualized a world containing moral good because such a 
world depends on the existence of free agents.66  In this sense of actualize, God would be 
creating states of affairs that caused the agent’s decisions, which he cannot do.  This seems 
contrary to Plantinga’s main argument; he further explains it by differentiating between a narrow 
and a broad sense of actualize.  In the narrow sense of the word, God cannot create a world filled 
with free creatures and actualize the states of affairs that cause their actions because actualize 
here means to cause in the most direct sense.  In the broad sense, God “can cause it to be the case 
that I freely refrain from A.  Even so, he can cause me to be free with respect to A, and to be in 
some set S of circumstances including appropriate laws and antecedent conditions.”67  Here 
Plantinga grants that there are some worlds that God can actualize which include free beings—if 
this argument against the Free Will Defence is correct.  The things that he actualizes are not the 
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exact state of affairs that cause their actions but rather the background circumstances that cause 
their actions; these laws include the laws of nature. 
 In order to continue exploring whether God could have actualized any possible world that 
includes his existence, Plantinga introduces an example involving a character named Curly.  In 
the example, Curley is a mayor who is offered a $35,000 bribe and accepts it.  The briber in the 
example then wonders whether or not Curley could have been paid off for $20,000.  Plantinga 
introduces this example as a set of counterfactuals:  
 (7) If Curley had been offered $20,000, he would have accepted the bribe or  
 (8) If Curley had been offered $20,000, he would have rejected the bribe.68   
Plantinga then criticizes a common way of understanding possible world semantics.  This idea 
states that counterfactuals can be verified if in that possible world the consequent of the 
counterfactual is true.  He argues that this has interesting consequences.  Namely, denying the 
antecedent might lead to the same conclusion as affirming the antecedent, or the antecedent is 
changed in such a way that the laws of nature must be broken in order for the consequent to 
obtain.69  After this argument and another along similar lines, Plantinga reformulates the 
question again stating, “Our question is really whether there is something Curley would have 
done had this state of affairs been actual.”70  He responds to this question by stating that there is 
an answer but that he does not know what that answer is. 
 At this point, Plantinga has still not soundly proven that humans are such that allowing 
them free will creates both moral good and moral evil.   Plantinga attempts to prove this through 
the introduction of ‘transworld depravity’.  He defines the term in the following way: 
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 A person P suffers from transworld depravity if and only if for every world W such 
 that P is significantly free in W and P does only what is right in W, there is a state of 
 affairs T and an action A such that 
  (1) God strongly actualizes T in W and W includes every state of affairs God  
  strongly actualizes in W,  
  (2) A is morally significant for P in W, 
 and  
  (3) If God had strongly actualized T, P would have gone wrong with respect to  
  A.71 
 
This means that there is no world in which God could actualize those who suffer from transworld 
depravity and thus create a world in which there is no moral evil.  Plantinga then states that it is 
possible that every individual suffers from transworld depravity.72   
 Plantinga takes this argument and applies it to the original problem of the Free Will 
Defence.  Recalling the original formulation of the problem, we see that the statements “God is 
omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good” is compatible with “There is evil in the world”73 if we 
assume that all creatures suffer from transworld depravity. 
 Plantinga’s argument is problematic because he states that it is possible for individuals to 
suffer from transworld depravity and concludes from this that the Free Will Defence is 
necessarily victorious.  His conclusion states that God could not actualize a world in which only 
moral good existed if individuals suffered from transworld depravity.  This statement is not by 
itself problematic.  He argues, that “it is possible that every essence suffers from transworld 
depravity; so it is possible that God could not have created a world containing moral good but no 
moral evil.”74  He uses ‘essences’ to combat the possible argument that God could have created 
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other people to inhabit the world without moral evil; he could have created a set of people who 
did not suffer from transworld depravity.75  As he states,  
  An essence simpliciter is a property P such that there is a world W in which there  
  exists an object x that has P essentially and is such that there is no world W* is  
  there an object that has P and is distinct from x.76 
Plantinga makes it the case that the world which God can actualize must contain agents with a 
certain characteristic.  He tries to make it the case that God had to create a world containing 
transworldly depraved essences.  However, doing so does not actually solve the problem.  He 
assumes that God had to actualize the exact essences that he did create and that these essences 
suffer from transworld depravity.  Even if God had to create these exact essences that does not 
guarantee that these essences necessarily suffer from transworld depravity.  Plantinga must do 
more work to get this stronger conclusion. 
 In addition, Plantinga ultimately uses this possibility of transworld depravity to conclude 
that the existence of evil is compatible with the omnipotence, omniscience, and absolute 
goodness of God.  He formulates the conclusion as  
 [1] Every essence suffers form transworld depravity… 
  [2] God actualizes a world containing moral good… 
  [3] There is evil.77   
However, in his formulation of this conclusion, he relies on the assertion that the world that God 
can create is characterized as one containing essences that necessarily suffer from transworld 
depravity.  In doing this, he begs the question.  His argument takes the following form: 
1. It is possible that the creatures of this world suffer from transworld depravity. 
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2. If this is the case, then God could not have created a world containing moral 
good but not moral evil. 
3. Let us assume that transworld depravity is a necessary characteristic of the 
creatures that God created. 
4. Thus, God could not have created a world different from the one that he did. 
Plantinga assumes his conclusion in order to prove that it is true, resulting in a logical fallacy.  
Furthermore, he avoids any attempt to prove that the beings that God did create suffer from this 
characteristic.  Perhaps it is not possible to prove this, but he does not have the ability to assert 
that the Free Will Defence is necessarily correct.  The best he can argue is that the Free Will 
Defence is possibly true given the truthfulness of the assumption that human beings are 
characterized by transworld depravity. 
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Chapter 3: Theravadin Buddhism: An Analysis 
 As in the case of the Christian theory, it should be noted, that there might be a difference 
between Theravadin Buddhist doctrine its every day practice.  However, there is a slight 
difference between the ways in which the two traditions are approached in this thesis.  The 
Buddhist tradition that is discussed is that which modern scholars attribute to Sakyamuni Buddha 
as his original teaching.  Thus, it is more likely that the theology being discussed corresponds to 
that which the practitioners actually did and thought in their everyday religious life.  Conversely, 
the Christian discussion focuses on the philosophical tradition exclusively.  This correspondence 
is not to be accepted as fact though; the distinction between theology and practice should still be 
considered for the Buddhist tradition as well. 
 A comment should also be made about the type of sources being used to discuss 
Buddhism.  In the section on medieval Christianity, I analyzed primary sources.  Here, however, 
I will be using secondary sources that both comment on and quote primary sources.  This is 
partially due to the fact that the primary sources being used by other scholars are attributed to 
Sakyamuni Buddha.  This attribution is opposed to a situation in which we know exactly who 
wrote the texts.  I follow the scholars’ example in also attributing these works to him.  Also, the 
writing within this tradition is such that scholars comment on and expound upon the primary 
sources which are translated from either the original Sanskrit or from some other language like 
Pali.  This difference is important because in the one case I am doing analysis of the original 
work and in the other I am analyzing the secondary source; both are of equal importance. 
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 Of the types of Buddhisms, the Theravadin tradition is usually thought to most closely 
resemble the original teachings of the Buddha, Sakyamuni.78  His teachings explain the concepts 
known as the Four Noble Truths.  These are: “the noble truth of suffering”, the noble truth of 
how suffering arises, the noble truth which explains the cessation of suffering, and the noble 
truth which details the way to attain that cessation, which is done through the use of The Eight-
fold Path.79  Through an understanding of these truths we will touch on the concepts that are 
important for this discussion. 
 To understand the basic tenets of Buddhism, however, it is best to begin with what is 
meant by the term ‘individual’ before diving into a discussion of these truths.  Within the 
Buddhist tradition, the individual person is thought to be divided into five interrelated 
aggregates, or functional parts.  Rahula defines these aggregates as the aggregate of matter, the 
aggregate of sensations, the aggregate of perceptions, the aggregate of mental formations, and 
the aggregate of consciousness.80  These aggregates totally comprise the individual.  There is 
nothing over and above them; this ultimately means that there is no human soul as it is usually 
thought of in the Western tradition.  As Rahula writes, “[A]ccording to Buddhist philosophy 
there is no permanent, unchanging spirit which can be considered “Self” or “Soul” or “Ego” as 
opposed to matter.”81   
 The lack of a soul also means that there is no permanent individual, as this concept is 
thought about in the Western tradition.  The “soul” holds special significance for mainstream 
thinking in the Western world as that part of the individual that makes her “her”.  Buddhism is 
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much different in this regard, claiming that the individual exists but as a changing, non-static 
thing.  This has implications for Buddhist agency.  In the Western tradition, the permanent soul 
is that which gives the individual agency; the individual is seen as an agent because she does not 
change over time.  There is something permanent we can refer to when we refer to her as a 
morally responsible agent.  Within the Buddhist tradition, the agent is the totality of the five 
aggregates.  The agent is an ever-changing thing that is conditioned by past experiences and by 
the world around her. 
 This lack of a permanent individual implies that consciousness is also dependent upon the 
physical conditions which give rise to it.  Rahula attributes this argument to Sakyamuni Buddha 
by stating, “The Buddha declared in unequivocal terms that consciousness depends on matter, 
sensation, perception, and mental formations, and that it cannot exist independently of them.”82  
As such, the “self” that individuals refer to is also subject to the law of cause and effect that is so 
very important within Buddhist doctrine.  It is not only that consciousness is subject to causes 
and effects that makes this Buddhist theory so noteworthy, but also that consciousness cannot 
exist outside of Dependent Origination.  This is much different from the Western view of the 
human agent as having the soul which might be influenced by outside sources but which 
somehow exists independently of them.   
 The aggregate of mental formations is particularly important because it includes 
volitional acts, whether they are good or bad.83  These volitional acts are the starting point for the 
general discussion of Buddhist ethics.  This discussion centers around the notion of karma.  
Dennis Hirota explains karma as the guiding force for the process of rebirth and death.  The 
theory holds that individual volitional actions “possess the power of inevitable working their 
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consequences.”84  The agent’s volitional actions in this life have consequences that are realized 
at some point in the future.  These consequences also regulate the way in which a person will be 
reborn.  For example, those who perform evil actions in this life will be reborn in a terrible state 
or will die quickly.  More specifically, the early Buddhist tradition equates volitional actions 
with karma.  Volitional actions are those which the agent chooses.  Choosing these actions has 
inevitable consequences in her future.  This is precisely what the theory of karma states.  Thus, 
the two are the same.  Furthermore, volition is ‘“mental construction, mental activity.  Its 
function is to direct the mind in the sphere of good, bad, or neutral activities.”’85  In other words, 
volition is a mental activity that directs the mind in all ethical activities.  Rahula states, volitional 
actions alone “can produce karmic effects.”86  These volitional acts are under the control of the 
agent.  The agent can control her future by becoming aware of her karmical connections to her 
surroundings. 
 The First Noble Truth states that ordinary “life according to Buddhism is nothing but 
suffering and pain.”87  The word translated here as “suffering and pain” (dukkha) most 
fundamentally means “unsatisfactoriness”.  It more clearly implies anguish rather than physical 
pain.   Every aspect of human existence is related in some way to suffering; humans get ill, grow 
old, and die.  None of these things is pleasant and none of them avoidable.  According to Rahula, 
there are three types of suffering: ordinary suffering, suffering produced by change, suffering 
produced by conditioned states.  The first type of suffering includes things like birth and death.  
This second type of suffering is partially the result of the impermanence of the individual.  The 
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third type of suffering is based on the agent’s conception of herself as an individual that is 
composed of the five aggregates.88 
 According to the Theravadin tradition, the Second Noble Truth is the truth “of the arising 
or origin of dukkha.”89  It states that suffering is caused by desire and greed, which is found 
throughout the individual’s life.  As Rahula says, “It is this…desire…that gives rise to all forms 
of suffering and the continuity of beings.”90  In other words, desire, and the attachment to the 
material world that stems from it, gives rise to samsara, which Rahula equates with the self-
feeding cycle of birth-and-death.91  The individual’s attachment to the material world is based on 
a delusional desire to see ourselves as unchanging or even eternal individuals.  When one attains 
Enlightenment, one destroys this delusion.  To be free from samsara is the Buddhist term for the 
continual cycle of life and death.  The end of samsara is the goal of the Eight-fold Path, which is 
the subject of the Fourth Noble Truth. 
 The Third Noble Truth explains the goal of the Buddhist practitioner, the cessation of 
suffering and of samsara.  To do this, the practitioner must eliminate thirst, which the Second 
Noble Truth tells us is the ‘thirst’ for the material world as expressed through things like desire 
and greed.92  When this is attained, the practitioner is said to have achieved nirvana, which 
means “blowing out”.  The agent ceases to take part in the cycle of birth and death.  She ceases 
to perform actions that have karmic results.93  Thus, her karma, that is, the result of her previous 
voluntary actions, ‘runs out.’  As described in Buddhist literature, nirvana is the end of samsara 
but is also freedom from suffering—it is described both positively and negatively.94  There are 
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no descriptions of what nirvana is like because it is beyond the ordinary concepts of human 
comprehension. 
 The Fourth Noble Truth describes the path that the individual takes to attain nirvana.  It 
is usually called the Eight-Fold Path or the Middle Path.  It consists of eight parts: correct 
understanding, correct thought, correct speech, correct action, correct livelihood, correct effort, 
correct mindfulness, and correct concentration.  In following the Eight-fold Path, the Buddhist is 
to always strive for moderation and for a lifestyle that hurts as few creatures as possible.  These 
two tenets outline the basic idea behind most of the premises listed above.  This path is aimed at 
perfecting the individual’s ethical conduct, mental discipline, and wisdom.  Rahula writes 
 According to Buddhism for a man to be perfect there are two qualities that he 
 should develop equally: compassion (karuna) on the one side and wisdom 
 (panna) on the other…..If one develops only the emotional neglecting the 
 intellectual, one may become a good-hearted fool; while to develop only the 
 intellectual side neglecting the emotional may turn one into a hard-hearted 
 intellect without feeling for others.95 
 
These two qualities are the result of following the Eight-fold Path.  According to Buddhism, it is 
important to focus on all aspects of the Eight-fold Path simultaneously so that both of these 
qualities develop at the same time.   
 The Buddha argued that all life is suffering and that the solution to such suffering is the 
Eight-fold Path.  The culmination of the Eight-fold Path is the attainment of the wisdom that 
allows one to end samsara, the cycle of life and death; this wisdom is Enlightenment.96  
According to Pande, the Truth experienced during Enlightenment is divided into two parts: the 
theory of “Dependent Origination…elucidates the nature of reality” and “Quiescence 
(nibbana)…the absence of empirical nature, the realization of which leads to the cessation of the 
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stream of consciousness.”97  As an explanation of the physical world, the theory of Dependent 
Origination is central to the topic discussed throughout this thesis.  Pande writes, “[The Theory 
of Dependent Origination] asserts that any object of experience depends for its existence or 
occurrence on the necessary and sufficient presence of its cause.”98  In other words, no actions 
occur that are not dependent in some way upon prior actions and present circumstances.  Such 
logic seems to imply that human morality might not depend on the agent’s responsibility.  How 
is one to be held accountable for her actions if they are determined by prior actions?  After a 
thorough examination of the theory itself, that question will be brought back up in the next 
chapter where it will be analyzed alongside the Western question of whether or not humans can 
be held responsible for their actions given the existence of an omniscient deity. 
 The Buddha’s conception of causality as an explanation of the world was novel because 
he argued that causality actually existed in the world and was not simply a name that we apply to 
the connections we observe between events.99  That is, causality exists outside of the human 
agent’s ability to perceive it.  In fact, he taught that this theory governed every aspect of the 
material world, including human existence.  As mentioned, Buddhism argues that humans 
consist of nothing more than the five aggregates.100  These aggregates are causally conditioned in 
the sense that the external objects cause sensation, which conditions the agent through the causal 
process.  This process is considered ‘perception’ for the Buddha and was the ultimate cause of 
suffering.  Kalupahana writes, “[T]his was a problem of prime importance because [the Buddha] 
realized that all the misery and unhappiness in the world were due to the evils associated with 
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sense perception.”101  Perception causes desire and obsession, which in turn cause the agent to 
become subjected to the physical world in order to fulfill those desires.102  As Pande argues, the 
ego is viewed as real when one perceives the material world.103  In other words, one thinks of 
oneself as being the observer of the events; the ego which interacts with the material world.  This 
belief is faulty, though, because humans are not spiritual things that exist outside of the events 
and circumstances from which they are made.104  This sense of self allows the agent to think of 
herself as having needs and desires that can only be attained through the material world.  As 
Pande says, human suffering is based on “the illusion of substance.”105  The substance referred to 
her is the substance of her ego.  The delusion that one is a permanent self is the illusion to which 
the statement alludes.  These desires are the ones that the Buddha says must be eliminated, along 
with the sense of an ego, in order to attain Enlightenment.   
 Kalupahana’s description of the causal process is sufficient to give a basic understanding 
of the way in which sense perception ultimately leads to suffering, but it is definitely not a total 
explanation.  In order to more fully understand how such suffering arises from everyday 
interactions with the material world, one must examine the Buddha’s Twelvefold Formula of 
Causation.  It states:  
 When this exists, that exists or comes to be; on the arising of this, that arises.  
 When this does not exist, that does not exist or come to be; on the cessation of 
 this, that ceases.  That is to say: 
  on ignorance depend dispositions;  
  on dispositions depends consciousness;  
  on consciousness depends the psychophysical personality; 
  on the psychophysical personality depend the six ‘gateways’;  
  on the six ‘gateways’ depends contact; 
  on contact depends feeling [or sensation]; 
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  on feeling depends craving; 
  on craving depends grasping; 
  on grasping depends becoming; 
  on becoming depends birth; 
  on birth depends aging and death. 
 In this manner there arises this mass of suffering.106 
 
This formula is the Buddhist attempt to describe in detail exactly how the individual is causally 
connected with the material world.  Nothing that we typically associate with the ego is left out of 
this formulation.  Furthermore, each of these connections attaches the individual to the material 
world.   
 Breaking the chain of causation allows one to end the cycle of samsara.  To pick a point 
in the chain as an example, getting rid of ignorance is one way to end the cycle; ridding oneself 
of craving is another.  This formula also intricately links the Buddha’s Theory of Dependent 
Origination with human suffering; human suffering is the result of a causal series.  This suffering 
is brought about through connection with the physical world, as detailed in the above passage.  In 
addition, the becoming referred to is the becoming attached to the material world through the 
creation of the ego.  In order to end suffering, one must disrupt the backward stretching chain of 
causal events. 
 The Buddha based this law of cause and effect on the theory of medicine prevalent during 
his lifetime.  The medical theory began with the patient’s outward symptoms and worked toward 
finding a ‘first’ cause for them by tracing back the immediate causes.  In a similar way, the 
Buddha viewed human suffering as a disease that must be cured though tracing the symptoms 
back to their original cause.  In developing a cure for this disease, he followed the four-stage 
theory of causation used by the medical community: detection of the symptoms, diagnosis, 
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therapy, and cure.107  In keeping with this typology, the symptoms are the effects of suffering, 
the diagnosis equates the cause of these effects with suffering, the therapy is the Eightfold Path, 
and the cure is Enlightenment.  Through this method the Buddha felt that all sentient beings 
could be cured of their suffering and the disease associated with the delusion that the self is a 
permanent entity. 
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Chapter 4: Free Will: A Comparison 
 Now that the theories within both traditions have been explained and analyzed, we can 
turn to a discussion of the concepts of free will as they are defined by both medieval Christianity 
and Theravadin Buddhism.  The free will theories will be analyzed through the use of a modern 
theory. 
 Both the Christian and the Buddhist philosophers must deal with the concept of free will 
and its relation to human wrongdoing.108  The Christian tradition must reconcile God’s 
omniscience with human freedom in order to account for human sin in light of his omni-
benevolence.  The Buddhist tradition must reconcile free will with the Theory of Dependent 
Origination in order to retain the agent’s moral responsibility in the face of what appears to be a 
fatalistic worldview.  In both cases there must exist a theory or concept that brings the two sides 
of the problem together. 
 Specifically for the Christian tradition, remember that the underlying problem is the 
Problem of Evil.  The rendering of it from earlier is fairly clear: 
1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient, 
being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or 
permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense 
 suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater 
 good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
 3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.109 
While the medieval theologians may phrase the problem as an attempt to understand humans as 
free creatures despite God’s ability to foreknow all of their future acts, the underlying tension 
only exists because humans have the ability to sin.  If humans did not sin, then there would be 
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little motivation for a solution to the problem.  That is, if humans did not have the ability to 
choose evil, then it would hardly matter if they acted freely.  No one would bother to analyze the 
problem if humans chose to do the morally good thing without fail. 
 With regard to human free will, the Problem of Evil takes something like the following 
form: if God is omniscient and wholly good, why does he allow humans to freely choose to do 
evil?  Is there not some way he, as an omnipotent being, could prevent them from sinning?  This 
underlying question leads to the formulation of each of the theories in the previous section on 
medieval philosophy.  The philosophers desired to absolve God from responsibility for the 
immoral behavior of the humans he created.  The way to do this, so they thought, was to prove 
that it was possible for humans to have free will. 
 Before beginning a discussion of concept of free will, one has to examine the differing 
ways to interpret the idea of freedom.  Kane identifies two different definitions of freedom; the 
compatibilist rendering of free will and the incompatibilist view.  To restate Hasker’s definition 
of compatibilism “an agent is free with respect to a given action at a given time if at that time it 
is true that the agent can perform the action if she decides to perform it and she can refrain from 
the action if she decides not to perform it.”110  The agent is free to perform an action but that 
does not limit the amount to which her decision is influenced by prior actions.  The agent’s past 
actions might even completely determine which of the possible outcomes she will choose.  This 
does not mean, though, that she did not choose the action. 
 The incompatibilist understanding of freedom maintains that “an agent is free with 
respect to a given action at a given time if at that time it is within the agent’s power to perform 
the action and also in the agent’s power to refrain from the action.”111  The agent has the ability 
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to perform an action and to not perform the same action in the same instant of time—both 
courses of action are equally plausible.  This concept of free will is not compatible with any type 
of determinism.  If it was, then the agent would not possibly for have the ability to both perform 
and to not perform an action. 
 With this basic understanding of freedom, it becomes clear that the Christian theologian 
typically relies on the compatibilist understanding.  The theologian must advocate for that form 
of freedom that accommodates divine foreknowledge as a form of determinism; the theory must 
allow for events to occur as God knows they will without his actually causing them to occur.  
Divine foreknowledge is a form of determinism in the sense that events must correspond with 
God’s knowledge.  As already stated, omniscience implies infallibility—God cannot be wrong 
about the things he knows.  If omniscience was not equated with determinism, then God could be 
wrong. 
 The Christian theologian could not argue for an incompatibilist theory of free will 
because doing so would prohibit him from asserting that God is omniscient.  Incompatibilism 
assumes that the agent is the sole cause of her actions, leaving out any other factors that 
determine her eventual choice.  God’s perfect knowledge would be among those things which 
would cause the agent’s actions and is not compatible with this notion of free will.  It is possible 
for the Christian theologian to argue for this sort of freedom but must do so at the expense of 
divine omniscience; he would have to advocate for a creator god that was all-knowing; this 
seems to go against traditional Christian doctrine. 
 According to Kane, there are two compatibilist requirements for freedom: the agent’s 
ability to do something whether or not it is actually done and that nothing prohibits the agent 
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from doing that which she wants to do.112  The Christian theologians analyzed are able to meet 
both of these requirements.  Within each of these philosophical systems, the agent has the 
physical and mental ability to perform action C or not to perform it.  Also, by allowing the 
human agent the ability to act freely, God does not interfere with human choices.  God can still 
foreknow future actions, but he does actively interfere with human choices.  Under this 
interpretation of the underlying structure of the philosophical arguments studied, there is a 
distinction between divine foreknowledge and divine interference.  As Augustine tries to argue, 
“if your foreknowledge is consistent with his freedom in sinning, so that you foreknow what 
someone else is going to do by his own will, then God forces no one to sin, even though he 
foresees those who are going to sin by their own will.”113  There needs to be the acceptance that 
God is able to know the agent’s future activities without causing them to occur.  As expected, 
none of the theologians discussed in the previous chapter advocate for divine interference 
because this would limit the freedom that they are all trying to guarantee.  Additionally, they 
advocate for some knowledge on God’s part which, nevertheless, does not compel future events 
or situations.  In short, they tend to limit or modify God’s knowledge rather than limiting human 
free will. 
 Molina’s theory of middle knowledge provides an example solution to the problem 
arising between free will and divine omniscience.  As noted, Molina argues that God has three 
types of knowledge: knowledge of those things that must be, knowledge of contingent things, 
and middle knowledge.  Middle knowledge is that through which he knows “how free creatures 
are going to exercise their freedom.”114  This allows God to know the outcome of all possible 
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situations for all possible agents without directly determining the actions of any of them.115  
Thus, the agent in this system directly meets the qualifications laid out by Kane for compatibilist 
theory; she is able to perform those actions that she wants to and nothing prohibits her from 
doing so. 
 By solving the tension resulting from the belief in free will and divine omniscience, the 
Christian theologians also solve the problem of evil as presented above.  If it can be proven that 
sin is the result of human free action, then God is absolved of any direct responsibility for it.  In 
other words, the human agent becomes responsible for her own actions and God remains omni-
benevolent and omniscient without any apparent contradiction.  It might be argued that God 
created the free willed humans who then chose to sin; Molina’s theory is especially relevant for 
this criticism because he argues that God foreknows what humans will do in any situation and 
also creates the particular world in which such situations occur.  However, Molina might respond 
by arguing that while God created the world, the human agents freely acted in a way that brought 
about the later circumstances; thus they are responsible for their actions and the affects of those 
actions.  An argument similar to this could be made for all of the theories previously mentioned.  
The basic solution to the tension remains despite this argument; God cannot be held responsible 
for the actions of free beings even if he creates them because they freely chose to act immorally 
post creation. 
 In the last chapter I discussed the Buddhist Theory of Dependent Origination which 
asserts that any object of experience depends for its existence or occurrence on the necessary and 
sufficient presence of its cause.”116  The theory appears to be fatalistic, completely eliminating 
human freedom.  I will argue that it does, in fact allow for free will.  I also discussed this 
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theory’s implications for human morality.  Specifically, it is difficult to understand how humans 
can be held responsible for actions which do not originate from their own will.  As mentioned, 
the problem is: 
 1. The Theory of Dependent Origination exists. 
 2. The theory of Dependent Origination states that all present circumstances 
 depend on their necessary and sufficient causes. 
 3. The human agent does some immoral act. 
 4. The human agent is not responsible for her actions because they are 
 predetermined by some action which was also predetermined. 
 This problem is complicated by the Buddhist theory of anatman, or the theory of no 
soul.117  Anatman is best characterized in this context as the lack of the Western concept of a 
permanent individual.  Rahula explains this theory as, “[t]he Absolute Truth is that there is 
nothing absolute in the world, that everything is relative, conditioned and impermanent, and that 
there is no unchanging, everlasting, absolute substance like Self, Soul, or Atman within or 
without.”118  From a Western standpoint, the lack of a soul poses a problem because of the 
assumed connection between the permanent agent and moral responsibility.  If the agent is 
impermanent or is not somehow distinct from the material world in which she lives, it seems 
difficult to assign blame to her for immoral actions (or praise if her actions are moral).  The 
Western concept of free will is based on the agency of the individual; agency, in turn, is 
attributed to the individual because of her assumed permanence, which is expressed through the 
notion of a soul. 
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 Buddhism addresses the concept of free will through its affirmation that the individual is 
comprised of nothing other than the five aggregates; all aspects of a person are subsumed within 
these functions.119  Rather than arguing that there is a distinction between the soul and the body, 
as do dualist philosophers, Buddhism claims that no such distinction exists.  This does not entail 
the denial of the existence of an individual in the colloquial sense of the word, as a thing that can 
be identified with a given name in a way that nothing else can.  It simply means that Buddhism 
does not attribute a metaphysical, permanent existence to the thing labeled the individual.  In 
short, the medieval philosophers believed that the agent was a permanent individual while the 
Buddhists claim that nothing in the material world is permanent in this way—everything is 
constantly changing within this system.   
 If one accepts the Buddhist rendering of the individual as sufficient for assigning moral 
responsibility, then we can move to an examination of morality’s relation to the theory of 
Dependent Origination.  According to the formulation of the problem above, the Buddhist 
understanding of the theory of Dependent Origination causes tension between the concept of free 
will and the concept of determinism because it is assumed that free actions are undetermined 
actions.  This is the same problem that the modern incompatibilist identifies.  Kane states the 
problem clearly  
 An event (such as a choice or action) is determined when there are conditions 
 obtaining earlier (such as the decrees of fate or the foreordaining acts of God or 
 antecedent causes plus laws of nature) whose occurrence is a sufficient condition 
 for the occurrence of the event.  In other words, it must be the case that, if earlier 
 determining conditions obtain, then the event will occur.120   
 
If there are conditions in the past that sufficiently determine the present event, then it seems—
according to this definition, as though free will cannot exist.  The basic formulation of the 
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problem with regard to the Buddhist philosophy specifically states that because the individual is 
comprised of the five aggregates which are causally determined, meaning that the individual is 
causally determined.  If the individual is causally determined, then free will cannot exist.   
 The Buddhist understanding of human agency is not this fatalistic.  Through its 
understanding of karma, Theravadin Buddhism allows for agent responsibility.  Before moving 
to a discussion of karma, I first want to identify those things which originate causally and what 
the Buddhist understanding of the will is.  According to Kalupahana, there are five spheres in 
which causality operates: “(1) physical (inorganic) order… (2) physical (organic) 
order…psychological order…(4) moral order…and (5) ideal spiritual order.”121  The next step 
involves defining what the will is within the Theravadin tradition.  Kalupahana states that 
“[t]here is no one single term in the Buddhist texts that could be considered the equivalent of the 
term will.  This means that the so-called will is not one single controlling force, but rather a 
whole group of tendencies.”122  These tendencies are related to the five aggregates discussed 
above.  Here is it important to note that the will is correlated with the idea of agency.  In other 
words, the will is that which comprises the Buddhist agent.123 
 Additionally, Kalupahana argues that volition, or will, “is the most important factor in 
determining whether a person is responsible or not for an action.”124  (Remember that the 
concept of karma is defined as volitional action.)  If volition is present in a person’s actions, then 
the person is to be held responsible; if it is not present than there is no moral responsibility.  
Volition corresponds with immediate decisions to act.  However, there may be instances where 
there is no obvious volition but the agent is still morally responsible.  These situations are 
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governed by the dispositions which “represent the gradually built up character involved in 
decision making.”125  Dispositions constitute the individual by “processing the personality, that 
is, giving form, guiding or directing, setting up goals, and trying to achieve them.”126  These 
dispositions are equal to the tendencies discussed in the previous paragraph.  The Western 
tradition has a similar idea only these traits are generally referred to as societal conditionings, 
environmental conditionings, etc. 
 Karma, as a theory, refers to the Buddhist doctrine of moral behavior.  Thus, ethical 
actions are those which produce karmic results.  Additionally, those actions which are deemed 
moral or immoral are those which are volitional.  To review, Kalupahana cites the Cula-
kammavibhanga-sutta on this matter “which maintains that a person who kills living creatures or 
has no compassion for them will, because of that behavior, be reborn in an evil state.  If he were 
not reborn in an evil state, and if he returned to life as a human, … he would be short-lived.”127  
 Kalupahana points to several causes of free will, further clarifying the distinctions that he 
makes between the different types of volitional actions.  Among them are outside sources, what 
are commonly known as instincts, internal motivations which are consciously known to the 
agent, and internal motivations which are not consciously known to the agent.128  The external 
motivations provide an explanation of human “behavior in terms of a stimulus-response sort of 
model.”129  The internal conscious motivations include feelings of attachment and desire.  
Internal unconscious motivations include desires like the desire to avoid death.130  Moral 
responsibility applies only to internal motivations for human behavior.  Of them, agents are 
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responsible for their conscious motivations because they are caused by the agent’s own desires.  
Agents are also responsible for those actions resulting from unconscious motivations because 
they are based on a “mistaken understanding of the nature of human existence.”131  This 
explanation relies on the Buddhist understanding of the agent’s attachment to the world as one of 
delusion and faulty desire.  The Eight-fold Path leads the agent to liberation from this suffering 
and to a wisdom that releases her from her delusional desires.   
 The Western philosophical community tends to not hold agents responsible for 
unconscious motivations like the desire to avoid death.  This type of motivation is usually 
categorized under the survival instinct or something equivalent.  The Western tradition does 
agree, though, that individuals should be held accountable for consciously motivated actions; 
these are the actions that are categorized as moral or immoral. 
 Because the concept of will is included as a causally determined thing, Buddhist doctrine 
is careful to state that there are causes of human behavior that are outside of the agent’s 
volitional actions.  However, the agent is still considered to have freedom.  In order to 
compensate for the notion of freedom, Buddhism states that while human action is determined by 
causes “it is followed by the correlated consequences.”132  This means that the causes do not 
strictly determine the effects.  As Kalupahana understands the Buddha’s teachings, causation is 
only a probability when human psychological tendencies are included in the discussion.133  The 
agent’s prior actions are sufficient to determine her future actions but are not necessary.  In short, 
the Buddhist allows for free will by stating that the agent affects her outcome in a meaningful 
way.  She causes her future circumstances.  The Buddhist argues that the inclusion of mental 
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capabilities is essential because morality does not function if the agent is not blameworthy.134  If 
the agent is not responsible for her actions, then it makes no sense to talk about morality and 
justice.   
 Both traditions want to claim that the individual is free with respect to volitional actions.  
However, both must argue for this from within a deterministic framework.  To make this 
argument, both traditions posit that humans have free will as one of their basic assumptions.  
This is interesting because neither attempts to prove, or even discuss the reasons for, this 
incredibly important assumption.  Whether or not the possession of free will is something that 
one can prove, I note this similarity to point out that both traditions alter their other beliefs rather 
than discarding human freedom. 
 This understanding of free will is similar to the Causal Theory of Action described by 
Kane.  According to him, this theory agrees with the Agent Causal Theory which holds that 
beliefs, intentions, and other similar reasons are true causes of action.135  This allows for the 
agent to be a determining factor in her own future rather than simply a pawn being driven by 
deterministic forces outside of herself.  In addition, the Causal Theory of Action argues that 
these reasons are themselves the products of prior events or reasons.  Kane writes, “causal 
theorists of action argue that the agent-causal structure of action can be explained in terms of 
causation by prior events or states of affairs.”136   
 According to the Buddhist theory of determinism, the agent present circumstances are 
determined by prior events; this includes her reasons, desires, and choices.  These mental 
formations are one aspect of the five aggregates, which are all part of the causally determined 
                                                
 134 Ibid, 123. 
 135 Kane, ( 2005), 61. 
 136 Ibid.  Italics in original. 
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network.137  In addition, Kane argues that reasons and decisions may be causes of agent actions 
but this does not entail that such causes necessarily lead to any given action because the agent’s 
will must be taken into account.  The Theravadin tradition leaves open the possibility that the 
agent can affect her future circumstances and determine the karma that she accrues through her 
volitional actions.  In fact, Kalupahana argues that causation must be viewed as probabilistic 
when mental attributes are taken into account.138  This corresponds to Kane’s understanding of 
the Causal Theory of action.  He states that "[s]ome causes are merely probabilistic; they make it 
more likely that certain events will occur without determining that those events will occur.”139  
Thus, it seems that this Buddhist theory is at least partially explained by a modern, Western 
theory. 
 If the agent’s decisions and choices are part of the causes for her actions, then she can be 
held responsible for those actions which have immoral consequences.  This rendering of the 
solution to the problem between the Theory of Dependent Origination and free will draws 
parallels between the Buddhist and Christian doctrines.  The Christian philosopher also wants to 
argue that the agent’s reasons and decisions are causes of her actions.  This is the only way for 
the agent to retain moral responsibility and thus absolve the omniscient God.  In order to argue 
for a theory which places the entire moral burden on the human agent, the philosopher must 
demonstrate that the agent’s free will actually causes the good or bad consequences that result 
from it.  As Kane says, “[I]f actions were not caused by our characters and motives, we could not 
be held responsible for the actions.  They would not be our actions.”140  If the agent’s choices 
were not the causes of her actions, then the effects would result from sources that were not under 
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her control.  The agent’s actions would be caused by her circumstances.  If those circumstances 
were created by another thing, then that thing would be responsible for her actions.  Thus, if God 
created the world and the situation leading to the one in which she exists at any given moment, 
then he would be responsible for her actions.  This would run contrary to the intended outcome 
of each of the theories set forth.  The only way to avoid this problem is to postulate that her will 
plays a direct part in the outcome.  Thus, the Christian theologian needs to accept some version 
of the Agent Causal Theory. 
 Whether or not the Christian theologian accepts the Causal Theory of Action with its 
additional premise that the agent’s decisions are determined by prior decisions or circumstances 
is open for debate.  It seems that the Christian theologian would want to argue that the agent’s 
decisions were based on prior occurrences.  If this were not the case, then the theologian would 
have difficulties explaining why the agent’s thoughts and actions were not arbitrary.  If the 
thoughts of the agent are not caused by prior occurrences, then they are indeterminate.  This 
concept has some serious consequences for the free will theorist.  Kane makes several arguments 
to this effect.  First, he states that the undetermined action is not one that is within the agent’s 
control; the action occurs spontaneously.141  If applied to the mental realm, this would mean that 
the agent’s thoughts and decisions to perform an action are not within her control.  Secondly, 
these undetermined events would actually hurt the individual’s freedom because she would have 
no control over them.  He gives the example of cutting a piece of cloth when your arm twinges, 
causing you to make a mistake.  This uncaused action actually impedes your progress.142  One 
can imagine a situation in which the agent has uncaused thoughts and other mental processes.  
The agent’s decisions would in no way reflect her thought process.  Additionally, have a series of 
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connected thoughts would be impossible because the previous thoughts would not cause the 
latter ones.  Finally, he argues that “if choices or actions are undetermined, the may occur 
otherwise, given exactly the same past and laws of nature.”143  Thus, the agent could have 
exactly the same upbringing and experiences as, say, her identical twin.  But, when faced with 
the same question, the two make different decisions.  This appears contrary to the way in which 
we normally understand our thought process to work.144  Thus, it seems that the Christian 
theologian wants to advocate for the stronger Causal Theory of Action. 
 If we except the proofs presented by each tradition as sufficient to prove that free will is 
compatible with some sort of determinism, then the problems set forth in the introduction are 
also solved.  God is absolved from responsibility for human sin and the Theory of Dependent 
Origination allows the agent to be responsible for her actions.   
                                                
 143 Ibid, 35.  Italics in original. 
 144 We must assume that the twins are exactly the same.  There can be no differences in experiences for the 
thought experiment to work. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 Both Christian theology and Buddhist doctrine hold that the individual has agency145 and 
a free will that is more like a conditioned will.146  For the Christian, this is necessary for her 
understanding of morality as somehow intimately connected with the agency of the individual.  
For the Buddhist, the concept of free will is also connected with the karmic theory which defines 
morality within this system.  The Buddhist agent is the producer of volitional actions which 
influence the future state of affairs. 
 As mentioned previously, the Christian theologian relies on a compatibilist understanding 
of free will in order to reconcile divine omniscience and free will.  The Buddhist theorist must 
also rely on this interpretation of human freedom.  In this sense the Theory of Dependent 
Origination functions very much like God’s omniscience.  Just as God foreknows what will 
happen in the future, the Theory of Dependent Origination states that the future is determined by 
the volitional acts of the present. 
 There is much debate about whether or not the theories examined in this thesis actually 
solve the Problem of Evil and the tension between complete determinism and free will.  As we 
saw in the second chapter, there are problems and conflicts associated with each of the theories 
presented.  None of them provides an adequate solution to why God is not responsible for the 
actions of humans.  The philosophical tradition is filled with critiques and modifications of this 
theory.  Further exploration of the modern scholarship on the subject is required to determine 
whether or not the question is answerable.  However, given the above argumentation, it looks as 
                                                
145 While the Christian tradition allows for the idea of an agent, the Buddhist tradition does not.  Because of its 
understanding of the individual as comprised of the skandas, the individual is granted agency but not the label of 
agent.  This is due to volition being only one portion of the skandas that make up the entire individual. 
146 Given the idea of compatibilism, free will, in the colloquial sense, does not exist.  What does exist, though, is an 
agency that is conditioned in a way that allows the individual a volition that is conditioned by previous actions.  I 
will continue to refer to this notion as free will, but the reader should keep this distinction in mind. 
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though the tension will always remain.  This tension is especially problematic because of divine 
omniscience.  Unlike the Buddhist, Christians must reconcile this perfected knowledge with their 
ability to do something which God did not, and could not, plan.  This means that their task is 
most difficult. 
 For the Buddhist, the compatibilist account of free will appears to have solved the tension 
between the Theory of Dependent Origination and human free will.  If it is possible for the agent 
to act freely within a deterministic framework, then the problem is gone.  However, it could be 
argued that the compatibilist definition of free will does not work.  Perhaps one favors the 
incompatibilist definition.  If this is true, then the proponent of the incompatibilist framework 
must deal with the problems raised by Kane. 
 The goal of this thesis was the comparison of one aspect found within both traditions.  It 
was important because comparison allows for new insights into both religions being discussed as 
well as a broader basis for understanding one’s own tradition.  Further comparison between the 
two religions might demonstrate that they are not as radically different as scholarship currently 
treats them.  This is not to say, though, that either tradition is less significant or should be 
analyzed in terms of the other.  Both have unique and meaningful aspects that should be brought 
to the table for discussion. 
 This thesis opened up questions about the nature of agency in both traditions.  Both 
traditions have very different understandings of what constitutes the individual’s relation to 
volition.  With the Christian tradition, the individual is viewed as the agent who performs the 
various actions.  The Buddhist tradition perceives the individual as a collection of skandas that 
are causally related to each other and to the external world.  Volition is one aspect of the skandas 
but does not warrant much attention with the Buddhist tradition. 
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 The exploration of the idea of agency will also highlight each tradition’s view of morality 
with regard to the agent.  As noted, the traditions have vastly different views of human 
wrongdoing, and it is my belief that exploring the concepts of agency will bring more clarity to 
the rationale behind their differing definitions.  This research will have to look at the primary 
sources of both Christians and Buddhists as well as comparing the different words used by each 
tradition to refer to similar concepts.  This latter aspect of the research is very helpful because the 
words used to refer to similar ideas in different traditions are often translated in vastly different 
ways and carry different connotations.   
 Further research into the nature of agency will open up new ways of thinking about it 
within both traditions.  The comparison will allow the scholar to ponder the question of what 
individuality and its relation to the actions that individuals perform.  Such scholarship is 
important in both the comparative literature and the philosophy fields of research. 
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